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Fighting Over the Figure of 
Gender 
 
Ali Miller* 
 
In an early draft of this Essay, I accidentally typed ―The 
Figure of Gender‖ instead of ―The Future of Gender,‖ the 
correct title for my remarks at Pace Law School‘s November 
2010 Symposium, After Gender?. I have kept this mistaken title 
because I think it nicely captures a vexed aspect of ―gender‖ in 
international human rights law (IHRL) today—who or what 
person is figured (imagined, addressed, elaborated, and 
maintained) with the use of the word ―gender‖? My comments 
on the panel took their impetus from suggestions about flirting 
made by cultural theorist and psychoanalyst Adam Phillips. 
Following his lead, I asked in my remarks, if we only flirt with 
serious things (madness, death, other people), then mustn‘t we 
pay close attention to how, and indeed with whom, we as 
advocates and scholars flirt when we flirt with gender?1 Or, as 
I describe below in my discussion about advocacy on gender in 
human rights legal settings, must we also pay attention to 
what happens when we fail to flirt with gender? 
In this Essay, I use Phillips‘ concern with the failure to 
 
  *  Thanks go to the Symposium organizers, especially Darren Rosenblum 
for convening the conference, and my co-panelists Elizabeth Emens, Paola 
Bergallo, Aminu Gamawa, Dianne Otto, and Ralph Wilde, as well as my 
editors at the Pace Law Review. Special thanks are due to Mary Anne Case, 
Susana Fried, Amy Kapczynski, Cynthia Rothschild, and Carole Vance for 
their careful comments and grounded and principled critiques on earlier 
drafts of this Essay, and in particular for their suggestions of additional 
resources. Fried and Rothschild, as directly engaged participants in many of 
the U.N. events described in this Essay, contributed significantly to the 
information as well as the analysis I have developed. While thanks are due 
for their input—all concerns over errors in this Essay run back to me. 
1. ADAM PHILLIPS, On Flirtation: An Introduction, in ON FLIRTATION, at 
xvii (1996). This Essay is drawn from remarks on a panel chaired by 
Elizabeth Emens and in preparation for which we exchanged short readings 
that could provide the conceptual underpinnings of our discussion. I chose 
two excerpts from Adam Phillips to guide my remarks. 
1
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flirt to guide my inquiry into the ways in which contemporary 
advocates reify, concretize, and turn gender into a project, a 
grant, or a territory with fiercely protected borders. I track an 
increasingly painful fault line visible in gender advocacy and 
policy at the global level. The fault line divides gender either 
into short-hand for attention to ―women‖ deemed a unified, 
single category; or gender into shorthand for an aspect of gay 
(male), or more recently transgender, identity. Reductive and 
mutually exclusionary uses of one of these two versions of 
gender abound in advocacy on U.N. policy and programming, 
and in the resulting policy, norms, development, and 
programming itself. 
These uses sit alongside frequently-voiced understandings 
of gender as a relational concept, one capturing the operation of 
situated rules and practices that constitute a range of 
masculine and feminine roles for bodies deemed male and 
female. These roles also assign resources and powers in all 
spheres of life. Yet despite the intentions of some non-
governmental organization (NGO) advocates and a few U.N. 
agency staff to retain the more capacious scope of gender as an 
analytic frame attending to relations of power and beliefs 
governing the fullest range of persons, my sense is that the 
dominant institutional use of gender in the U.N., and among 
many advocates, is a flat, binary, and exclusionary one. 
Moreover, in this binary, when figured as an attribute of 
women, gender has connotations of heterosexuality; when 
figured as an aspect of men, gender appears to signal 
homosexuality. Recently, however, on the gendered/gay man 
side of the institutional gender split one can find references to 
―gender identity‖ emerging as a protected aspect of persons. As 
used here, ―gender identity‖ flags an aspect of identity linked to 
the sense of being male or female. In U.N. advocacy it generally 
signals transgender. Notably, it has emerged in IHRL advocacy 
on the (homo)sexual orientation side of gender.2 
 
2. For more discussion about the reified phrase SOGI, or sexual 
orientation and gender identity, as well as the other exclusions such as 
sexually non-conforming women, including lesbians in this bifurcation, see 
infra Parts III and IV. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
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Moreover, beliefs about gender‘s un-severable link to 
sexuality increasingly permeate many deployments of ―gender‖ 
in programming and advocacy at the U.N. The under-analyzed 
assumptions about sexuality, including the naturalization of 
expressions of gender non-conformity as always and only 
proxies for homosexuality, contribute to the further division of 
gendered rights in advocacy and norm building. This Essay will 
weave in and around the effects on gender claims of the 
presumed links between sexuality and gender, but for now, it is 
enough to say that the bifurcation of gender as a term in the 
U.N. rights work—parsed as if women identified through 
gender analysis must be heterosexual and men who can be 
analyzed with regard to gender must be homosexual—
simultaneously relies on, and obscures, the sexual work that 
gender is being used to do. And by inviting in only sexuality to 
describe gender (and vice versa) our gendered conversations 
are both impoverished and oddly regressive. 
To explore the question of who is figured in the use of the 
term ―gender‖ in contemporary IHRL and to consider the 
strategic and social justice-hampering effects of these 
assignments, I focus first on evidence of a gender-split within 
NGO U.N. rights advocacy, and then on an example of this 
embodied schism of gender in a new norm on gender emerging 
from within a U.N. human rights treaty body. The effects of the 
gender division are mutually reinforcing in vicious/virtuous 
circles: NGO perspectives increasingly shape the making and 
implementation of international rights standards and policies 
at the U.N., while institutional imperatives and politically 
dictated channels of work also shape the direction and scope of 
gender rights advocacy. 
This Essay‘s focus on the fault line of gender will first 
follow the evidence of the gender splits on their own terms, and 
then dig deeper into the political contexts and conceptual 
underpinnings, including ideas about sexuality, that enable 
them. 
Overall, I am concerned that gender advocates are being 
driven farther apart from each other in alliance and discourse 
by the institutionalization of the gender fault lines, and that 
the resulting policies are weakening the progressive potential 
3
840 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:3 
 
of gender as an analytic tool which might benefit all. 
 
I. Gender, Gender Territorialization and Some Implications of 
the U.N. as Site of Gender Struggle 
 
The conflict over who owns gender—what I call ―gender 
territorialization‖—appears in multiple U.N. institutions and 
settings, and can have significant effects on the normative 
content of developing international human rights law. For 
example, if gender-based violence (GBV) is conventionally 
understood to be violence directed at women by men, then legal 
changes in sexual assault laws that are called for in campaigns 
on sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) need not attend to 
the rape or sexual assault of men, despite its ubiquity in both 
conflict and custodial contexts. GBV laws are left as ―women 
specific‖ in their content and application. 
This gender split can also have effects on policy and 
programming: who is prioritized for participation and funding 
in ―gender-sensitive outreach, education and services‖? 
(Heterosexual)women, trans persons, gay men? Who is 
squeezed out? Ironically, it appears lesbians do not register in 
this territorialization of gendered bodies, and normative 
masculine and (presumed heterosexual) men are perhaps left 
to shift for themselves (perhaps to retain existing power, or to 
fail to learn new roles and behaviors?).3 In this framework, the 
struggle among subsets of advocates (notably not all groups 
associated with gender for example, fall into these ―sects‖) is 
exacerbated by the U.N.‘s silo-ing of issues (women‘s rights and 
human rights, identity as mandate (race, child, women, etc.) 
and this U.N. institutional tracking in turn has effects 
narrowing the more capacious and transformative claims 
around gender overall. 
My examples show two superficially distinct guises of 
gender territorialization in the U.N.: in one case, the turf fight 
is overt—a subset of advocacy groups representing ―gender as 
identity/woman‖ struggle with a subset of groups representing 
 
3. Kate Sheill, Losing out in the Intersections: Lesbians, Human Rights, 
Law and Activism, 15 CONTEMP. POLITICS 55, 57–60 (2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
2011] FIGHTING OVER THE FIGURE OF GENDER 841 
 
―gender as gay or trans identity/male‖ over priority in policy 
and funding, primarily in the worlds of health and anti-
violence work. In the second case, the tension is discernible in a 
deafening silence—the parallel and non-referential advocacy 
carried out by the two camps, sometimes in silo-ed fora. These 
separate fora operate with agendas which may be understood 
as women specific versus human rights general, or race 
specific, or have sub-agendas that are understood as LGBT 
specific, or reproductive health specific. While specificity is 
critical to ensure appropriate tailoring of remedies for rights 
violations and services, my concern is that this ―gender 
exclusionary‖ version of specificity has moved advocates‘ 
analysis away from the common structures and forces that 
produce the specific gendered effects, and the resulting 
exclusionary analysis most definitely blocks strategic coalitions 
among the sub-groups facing the common gendered repression. 
For example, reproductive health rights discussions focus 
on women who have sex with men, and HIV sexual health 
agendas sometimes focus on concentrated epidemics in so-
called marginalized groups such as MSM and sex workers. It is 
interesting to note that women sex workers who sell sex to men 
are deemed non-reproductive during those transactions and fall 
outside of both conversations. In these silos, some women‘s 
groups highlight only the victimization of women and their 
abuse by men, in their press for ―gender equality,‖ or stress 
only attention to women in the need for education, services, 
and other protections from gender-based violence (a conflation 
accomplished in part by the replacement of the acronym for 
―violence against women‖ with GBV).4 Some of these groups 
 
4. Effectively, heteronormative men are denied ―gender‖ in these 
conflations and slides. The category of GBV also often picks up ―violence 
against women and children,‖ a switch between gender/sex systems and age 
regimes, which is equally, but differently, troubling. The persistence of the 
quasi-legal grouping of ―women and children‖ as a meaningful category 
(women take care of children? women are like children in lack of rights?) in 
programmatic and policy rhetoric remains evident in the U.N. The release of 
the Secretary General‘s Global Strategy for Women and Children’s Health 
reveals this tendency. See Global Strategy for Women and Children’s Health, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sg/globalstrategy (last visited Nov. 7, 
2011). The persistent conflation occurs even as earlier work carefully pointed 
5
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raise concerns about the criminalization of sex for women only 
outside of marriage, highlighting criminal prosecutions under 
sex-specific discriminatory laws. On the other hand, another 
subset of groups focused on ending discrimination or violence 
directed at persons because of their sexual orientation and 
gender identity (SOGI) focus their ―gender‖ advocacy on 
violence directed at gender non-conforming persons (gay men 
or transpersons, usually male to female/MTF) or call attention 
to the need to decriminalize of same-sex behavior (often 
codified as crimes in so-called sodomy laws) in the context of 
penalties for sex outside of marriage, including but often not 
limited to same-sex sexual behavior. They sometimes but not 
often work on issues and agenda items relating to women‘s 
reproductive or sexual health.5 
Both of these streams of activism and policy-making are 
carried out as part of human rights advocacy at the global 
level, such as in the U.N. Human Rights Council, or in 
meetings with, and reports to, the human rights treaty bodies. 
 
out that health interventions for newborns and young children do not 
automatically translate into health benefits for their mothers, and vice versa. 
See Who’s got the power: Transforming health systems for women and 
children, U.N. MILLENIUM PROJECT, 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/maternalchild-complete.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011). However, the collapse of women and children into 
a single category in the context of violence may have a distinct sexualized 
aspect: the ―violence against children‖ that is usually enumerated under the 
GBV rubric on closer inspection tends to be sexual abuse. For example, the 
old, historic crime of ―trafficking‖ (initially defined in the ―White Slavery 
Conventions‖ as the mere movement of persons into prostitution, i.e. ―to 
gratify the passions of another‖) encompassed ―women,‖ ―women and girls,‖ 
and ―women and children‖ at different moments in history. Current anti-
trafficking projects still often rhetorically start with women but will slide into 
talking about women and children, revealing the extent to which women are 
understood to be like under-age boys and girls in regard to their incapacity 
and the importance of protecting their chastity, and boys are like virginal 
girls in that they must be protected against sexual encounters with men, i.e, 
homosexual desire. For an introduction to this shifting terrain of legal scope, 
see ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
(2010). 
5. Francoise Girard, Negotiating Sexual Rights and Sexual Orientation 
at the U.N., in SEX/POLITICS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONT LINES 311, 315-16, 
318-19 (Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky & Robert Sember eds. 2007), 
available at http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/index.php. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
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I am concerned that the political culture of the advocates plus 
the institutional inertia of divided U.N. agendas leads to a 
failure of both streams of advocates to reference gender-diverse 
claims outside their own body of knowledge; it leads to a failure 
to learn from the analyses undergirding the different gender 
claims, and thus to a failure to build on the doctrinal 
implications of these claims. The intense, suffering-victim-
subject focus of the subgroups (women-only versus sexual-
orientation/sodomy law-focused groups) limits the parameters 
of the groups interested in more gender-relational advocacy.6 
And the advocates are stymied by the tendency of the U.N. 
structures to assume a gender specificity/singularity even if the 
advocates have tried to explain differently.7 In a recent 
interpretive statement, the Committee that monitors the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) has broken this binary by explicitly 
integrating the SOGI rubric. This statement by CEDAW is the 
subject of my analysis of U.N. structures below in Part V and 
may be the exception that (so far) proves the rule of the binary 
divisions within gender. 
As this Essay proceeds, fair warning: the acronyms will 
 
6. See, e.g., Statement of African Social Justice Activists on the Threats of 
the British Government to “Cut Aid” to African Countries, WOMEN‘S GLOBAL 
NETWORK FOR REPROD. RTS., http://www.wgnrr.org/news/statement-african-
social-justice-activists-threats-british-government-%E2%80%9Ccut-
aid%E2%80%9D-african-countri (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). The statement 
invites a comparison and ranking when it notes ―a context of general human 
rights violations, where women are almost as vulnerable as LGBTI people.‖ 
See id. (emphasis added). For an exploration of the victim subject as a central 
trop of women‘s human rights organizing, see Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of 
Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 
(2002) (arguing that the international women‘s rights movement‘s focus on 
violence against women (VAW) has helped reinforce women as the victim 
subject). 
7. See infra Part III for an elaboration on the U.N. structures. For a 
more complete discussion of the problem of the exclusionary siloes of U.N. 
work, see Alice Miller & Mindy J. Roseman, Normalizing Sex and its 
Discontents: Establishing Sexual Rights in International Law, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER iii (2011). See also Lisa Crooms, Indivisible Rights and 
Intersectional Identities or, “What Do Women's Human Rights Have to Do 
with the Race Convention?,‖ 40 HOW. L.J. 619 (1997). 
7
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continue to proliferate—VAW (violence against women), GBV 
(gender-based violence), SGBV (sexual and gender-based 
violence), LGBT (lesbian, gay bisexual and transgender), 
LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex), MSM 
(men who have sex with men), SOGI (sexual orientation and 
gender identity). Advocates and scholars both bemoan the 
extent to which movements around gender and sexuality have 
become more known by their acronyms than their politics and 
principles: indeed one way to understand the conceptual 
problem around the narrowing sectarianism of the movements 
is to see the work done by the condensing power of the 
acronyms. But that is another essay.8 
 
II. Gender as Solomon‘s Baby 
 
I begin the mapping of ―gender territorialization‖ with 
evidence of the overt struggle between advocates. While 
tensions over who owns gender have been rumored for some 
time, an explicit disagreement over gender came to a head in 
2008-2009 in a process organized around the development of a 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
report, Gender Guidance National AIDS Responses.9 UNDP is a 
founding co-sponsor of UNAIDS (the joint structure in the U.N. 
through which resources, policies, and priorities of the U.N.‘s 
coordinated response to HIV/AIDS are developed and 
managed).10 UNDP adds to HIV/AIDS responses beyond those 
of the health sector: it addresses ―dimensions of HIV that relate 
to development planning and mainstreaming; governance of 
 
8. Such an essay would take on the specific occlusions of ideas 
accomplished by these acronyms, and especially note those concepts and 
persons that are formally flagged in the acronym but nonetheless get short 
shrift in actual advocacy and policy, such as ―lesbian‖ and ―inter-sex,‖ as well 
as transgender persons and issues. 
9. 22nd Meeting of the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, 
Chiang Mai, Thai., Apr. 23-25, 2008, Draft Gender Guidance for National 
AIDS Responses, UNAIDS/PCB(22)/08.3/Rev.1 (Apr. 11, 2008) [hereinafter 
Draft Gender Guidance for National AIDS Responses]. 
10. About Us, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
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HIV responses; and law, human rights, gender equality and 
sexual diversity.‖11 UNDP was responsible for preparing the 
guidance for UNAIDS, as the lead agency on gender among the 
UNAIDS co-sponsors. The phrasing around ―gender equality 
and sexual diversity‖ was a hard fought and precious aspect of 
UNDP‘s rights orientation, and interestingly, included an 
unusual moment of U.N. agency perspicacity: a consensus 
within UNAIDS co-sponsors and secretariat that ―gender‖ 
could be used in its broader, more relational sense to address 
issues arising among and for diverse women, men, and 
transpersons. The guidance note was meant to help 
governments, donors, the U.N. system, and civil society12 
understand why gender—especially gender inequalities—
mattered to the spread of, and responses to, the epidemic. 
Advocates from many different sectors who were 
experienced in global AIDS advocacy participated in a process 
of consultation in 2008 and 2009. Among other steps, a 
formally-constituted NGO delegation to the UNAIDS Program 
Coordinating Board (PCB) participated in considerations of 
direction and scope of the draft guidance note. Advocates have 
noted that the PCB is a rare site of solid civil society 
participation in the often closed-door U.N. system—one of what 
feels like a handful of open sites remaining, which also means 
that NGO participants responded to the outcomes with a 
feeling of high stakes.13 Representatives included women and 
women‘s health‘ groups, networks of people living with HIV or 
AIDS, sex worker groups, youth groups, gay identified and 
MSM groups, and transgender groups. 
I will let texts excerpted from two related documents speak 
to the struggle for the territory of gender. The first excerpt is 
from the Executive Summary from the Guidance Note as 
issued by UNAIDS: 
 The guidance encourages countries to 
 
11. Id. 
12. The U.N. thinks in these categories of actors, and builds its processes 
around state interests first, and other groups second. 
13. Special thanks to a close colleague for this observation from ―within 
the trenches.‖ 
9
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understand how harmful gender norms and 
gender inequality contribute to the spread of 
HIV, and how HIV differentially affects women, 
men, girls and boys. It also points to the specific 
impact of gender norms on HIV amongst men 
who have sex with men, which affect this 
population directly as well as contributing to the 
broader epidemic, because many men have sex 
with both men and women. 
 . . . . 
 In consultation processes during the 
development and pre-testing of the guidance, one 
of the issues discussed extensively was the 
degree to which the guidance should include 
attention to men who have sex with men and to 
transgender populations, given the direct 
relevance of gender norms and gender inequality 
to these groups. Many respondents asked for a 
full integration of these issues and populations, 
important in and of themselves as well as 
because many men have sex with both men and 
women. . . . However, others expressed concern 
that attention to men who have sex with men 
detracts from the importance of focusing on 
women and girls and their unequal relationships 
with men and boys, and suggested that it would 
be more appropriate to keep the guidance focused 
on the needs of girls and women and to develop 
separate guidance documents addressing sexual 
minorities.14 
The Guidance note then proceeds to focus primarily on 
women and girls, but does make reference to the fact that their 
risks for HIV exposure are related to the risks born by men, 
including men who have sex with men, sex workers, and trans-
populations. 
The compromise‘s focus on women, with limited reference 
 
14. Draft Gender Guidance for National AIDS Responses, supra note 9, 
at 7, 10. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
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to the epidemics‘ connections across populations of the 
Guidance Note, was the product of intense and painful 
divisions among NGO advocates behind the scenes, 
disagreements in which advocates questioned each other‘s 
trustworthiness and overall human rights interests, all based 
on their prioritization of groups (women, MSM, etc.) rendered 
vulnerable by gender. As evidence of the tenor of the internal 
dissension over gender I turn to quotations from a report 
(publicly circulating) of a 2010 ―healing meeting‖ which was 
called by and meant to respond to the bad feelings generated in 
the process of the NGO participation in the PCB delegation. 
The report from the ―healing meeting‖ says: 
[I]n light of the tensions over the meaning of 
gender in discussions at the UNAIDS board 
meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to find 
common ground among activists in the pursuit of 
policies and programs that support multiple 
constituencies: all women and girls in their 
diversities and experience, gay and other men 
who have sex with men, transgender people, 
people who use drugs, people living with HIV, 
and sex workers. 
. . . . 
. . . [They highlighted] the need to shy away 
from divisive debates over the term ―gender‖ by 
highlighting specific populations. . . . just as the 
group agreed to specify women, gay men and 
other MSM, transgender communities rather 
than use the term ―gender,‖. . . .15 
. . . . 
Funding and competition for funding were 
 
15. Notably, in terms of content of policy approaches, ―[p]articipants 
found areas of common ground around shared goals of: decriminalizing same 
sex relationships, unintentional HIV transmission, drug use, and ensuring 
access to comprehensive reproductive services that support a woman to make 
decisions about what happens with her body.‖ NGO Delegation to the 
UNAIDS PCB, PCB NGO Delegation‘s ―Common Ground‖ Meeting Report, 2 
(Oct. 19-20, 2010), http://unaidspcbngo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/CG-
report_EN.pdf [hereinafter Common Ground Report]. 
11
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discussed as underlying causes of tension for the 
communities. . . . earmarked for discussion in 
future work, as there was a feeling that this topic 
was not given the time it needed. The discussion 
focused not only on equal access to resources but 
also on the use of those resources . . . . 
Participants talked about the way donor 
funding pits groups or communities against one 
another. . . . They discussed money as part of the 
power dynamic and its use to silence all 
communities.16 
The NGO ―healing meeting‖ report, while written in 
sometimes opaque and NGO-speak generalities, suggests first 
in its title, and then in its text, the depth of wounded alliances 
among advocate associated with women or with MSM/gay or 
transgender women. It closes with tense commitments about 
the assignment of gender to various groups for the future. Part 
of the compromise agreement is that the word ―gender‖ as a 
modifier is to be avoided in favor of specification of 
communities: MSM, gay-identified persons, (hetero)sexual 
women, transpersons, and male, female or trans sex workers—
an ironic result for advocacy groups constituted to think about 
a ―gender guidance.‖ 
The concern of advocates that to use gender is to divide the 
―baby‖ is so palpable that, in a world of multiple epidemics 
(concentrated among sex worker, MSM, or IDU populations or 
generalized throughout the population), gender as a term has 
become a barrier to attending to the inequalities and biases 
connected to gender stereotypes that govern the path of the 
epidemic. Moreover, it is understood that the path of money is 
gendered: funding for studies, for services, for outreach and 
education, and for advocacy follows specific priorities—
including those set by the UNAIDS gender guidance note.17 
It is worth noting that while each ―gender camp‖ has 
certain kinds of access to power, none of the competing gender 
 
16. Id. at 1, 3-5. 
17. This struggle over money spans both prevention and treatment to 
use the two categories most commonly at play in funding debates. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
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advocates (women living with HIV, trans-women in sex work, 
married man having sex with men, etc.) actually controls the 
state or donor responses to their requests. Looking inter-
sectionally, each of the differently situated ―gender claimants‖ 
may have an aspect of privilege and an aspect of abjection: the 
―innocent infected wife‖ stands both as a viable, sympathetic 
public victim and as a person without full legal rights in many 
societies; the man having sex with men is both a man possibly 
facing risks of violence or blackmail and other forms of coercion 
in his town for his same-sex behavior, and, as a matter of law, 
maybe the head of his household and the holder of sexual 
privileges over his wife. 
As a matter of ―gender,‖ they are all affected by gender 
inequities and a set of organizing principles privileging certain 
forms of masculinity and femininity, but in the silo-ization of 
money and policy priorities, they can either address ―women 
and girls‖ or ―non-gender normative men‖ (code word: sexual 
minority). The histories and institutions of the work on these 
populations are different—all marginalized, but differently 
marginalized, commanding different supporters, agencies and 
rhetoric, and some (like lesbian identified women) simply 
invisible.18 
 
III. Gender Steps Out19 and into the U.N. 
 
I turn next to different institutional and historical 
rhetorics of gender: the practices initially locating—indeed 
fixing—women and gender, and gender as women, as a 
permanent, reified U.N. category, and then the splitting of the 
category of gendered rights into the mutually exclusionary (in 
some practices) claims of gendered (heterowomen) and gay 
men/transpersons (SOGI claims). To do this I present a brief 
and therefore partial institutional snapshot of the genealogy 
 
18. Cynthia C. Rothschild, The L and the G Word, MUJERES ADELANTE, 
Aug. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.aln.org.za/downloads/Mujeres%20Adelante_Friday.pdf. 
19. This subheading invokes a chapter in a book by Jonathan Ned Katz, 
periodizing when ―the heterosexual steps out.‖ See JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE 
INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 83 (1995). 
13
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and architecture of ―gender as women‖ in the U.N., and then I 
track the rise of a new gender constituency—the SOGI 
constituency—and its surprisingly new integration into a 
previously ―woman-as if only one kind of woman‖ (i.e. 
heterosexual bio-women) specific treaty, CEDAW.20 
CEDAW of course is only one of the many venues and 
structures that the U.N. has carved out over time and served 
up to the world as ―addressing women.‖21 These women-specific 
structures include: U.N. Charter-created political bodies 
(where governments speak in their national interest), such as 
the Commission on the Status of Women/CSW); independent 
expert treaty-based bodies, such as CEDAW (part of the U.N.‘s 
human rights treaty body system); and U.N. agencies and 
funds (programmatic arms of the U.N. system constituted as 
arms of the U.N. bureaucracy, such as the old Division for the 
Advancement of Women/DAW or UNIFEM, a sub-agency of 
UNDP, and the United Nations International Research and 
Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-
INSTRAW). There are also special advisers on women to the 
Secretary General, Special Rapporteurs on women and various 
women-identified issues in the Human Rights Council, and a 
new Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict that provides reports to the Security 
Council. 
Most recently, in 2010 the U.N. rolled all of its women-
identified agencies into a single agency, the U.N. Entity on 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (U.N. 
Women). Pressure from advocates and states concerned that 
women and the programs serving them were still massively 
disenfranchised and disproportionately impoverished around 
the world, despite a proliferation of (minor) agencies and 
procedures dedicated to women, forced this consolidation and 
elevation (at least formally) of institutional attention to 
 
20. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, DIVISION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
21. For a critique of the very subject/object ―woman‖ of CEDAW, see 
Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What's Wrong with Women's Rights, 
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98 (2011). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
2011] FIGHTING OVER THE FIGURE OF GENDER 851 
 
women.22 The NGO campaign to support this new agency 
marked itself as UNGEAR—U.N. Gender Equality 
Architecture Reform, and included groups that work on diverse 
sexualities and diversity among gender roles—but its product, 
i.e. what the Member States of the U.N. agreed to, was a U.N. 
agency on women.23 
The many other branches of the U.N. that address human 
rights, health, and development are of course formally ―gender 
neutral.‖24 Historically, these branches, including the old U.N. 
Centre for Human Rights (now Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights) and the U.N. Development 
Program, ignored both gender analysis and women in many 
contexts with a vengeance, at best including references to 
―women and children.‖25 
The ―gender fights‖ of 1995 at the U.N.‘s Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing simultaneously opened the 
U.N. to free-wheeling debates over the scope of gender (are 
there five genders? Is talking about gender really talking about 
homosexuality? What are the different ways to differently 
gender women? How are men and women gendered? ) and, in 
practice, produced gender work in the U.N. system which solely 
meant work on women. This reduction (talking about gender 
equals talking about women) held for the next decade and is 
just breaking now, with SOGI-based rights work. 
Following the Beijing Platform for Action, which stressed 
gender mainstreaming for the entire U.N. system, the non-
women branches of the U.N. have been the targets of now 
 
22. U.N. Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 
G.A. Res. 64/289, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/289 (July 21, 2010), http://www.un-
ngls.org/IMG/pdf_Report_July_2010_N0947917.pdf. 
23. GENDER EQUALITY ARCHITECTURE REFORM (GEAR) CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.gearcampaign.org/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
24. This means gender mainstreaming is directed to all the Charter-
created political bodies of the Security Council, General Assembly, 
Commission, now Human Rights Council, and its special mechanisms 
(independent experts), the many agencies and funds (WHO, UNICEF, 
UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO), the various ad hoc tribunals, and the ICC. 
25. For an early review of the ―faint‖ impress of gender analysis in the 
U.N. human rights bodies, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, 
TOKEN GESTURES: WOMEN‘S HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED NATION REPORTING 
(1993). 
15
852 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:3 
 
predictably regular gender mainstreaming resolutions, and 
plans calling on them to ―ask the woman question‖ as an aspect 
of their work. Gender mainstreaming in IHRL drives funding 
for projects targeting and evaluations assessing women‘s rights 
in the context of concerns for violence, health, and equality in 
political life, housing, and education. Overall, with some 
exceptions, remarkably little of the project of gender 
mainstreaming has addressed background structural rules 
organizing social relations between persons deemed male and 
female (according to presumed male-female biological sex 
differences), and very little in the U.N.—up until the UNAIDS 
gender guidance note—has attempted to address men in their 
relationships to each other, or women in their relationships to 
each other as ―engendering,‖ or as a necessary component of 
gender mainstreaming. 
Thus, although the ―gender fights‖ of 1995 served to 
propagandize around fears that ―gender‖ opened the door to 
homosexuality and bi-sexuality (and bestiality and pedophilia, 
in some delegation accounts), no one to my knowledge in the 
U.N. has worried about gender mainstreaming requiring 
attention to diversity of gender among men (i.e. men who have 
sex with men or trans persons). Notably a few opponents of 
gender mainstreaming in Europe have sought to call attention 
to the potential of gender mainstreaming work to challenge the 
status of hetero-normative men, and the notion of their fixed 
identities and behaviors.26 A few self-avowed Christian-values 
groups have claimed a link between gender mainstreaming and 
the homosexual agenda in the Caribbean, but notably, the 
groups working on decriminalizing so-called sodomy laws do 
not use the term gender mainstreaming to capture their work.27 
 
26. It is notable that gender mainstreaming has targeted changing men 
(education, policies engaging with their sense of their roles) in only a few 
settings, and European examples of gender mainstreaming actually taking on 
education and roles of boys and men has been attacked for this by Vatican 
inspired critics. See, e.g., Gabriele Kuby, Gender Mainstreaming—The Secret 
Revolution, VATICAN MAG. (2008), available at 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008_docs/GenderMainstreaming.pdf. 
Thanks to Mary Anne Case for calling this work to my attention. 
27. See, e.g., E-mail from The Beliz Action Team to Colin Robinson (Oct. 
30, 2011, 21:28 PDT) (on file with author) (―The end goal is SAME SEX 
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A few scholars have begun to point out that some new gender 
norms are finding their way into global programming outside 
the U.N. through gender mainstreaming, such as in lending 
programs of the World Bank, and its new vision of 
companionate marriage.28 But overall, I would argue that 
gender sectarianism put blinders on both advocacy and 
programmatic work in the U.N., limiting gender functionally in 
U.N. programming to ―asking about women.‖ And in the eyes of 
many rights advocates, not doing that very well. 
Generally speaking, no one, including traditional women‘s 
rights advocates, is happy with the current status of gender 
mainstreaming work, or with the status of the term ―gender.‖ It 
turns out that the focus on women as sole owners of gender has 
not led to speedy global change, including reduction of ―GBV.‖ 
Recent scholarship from feminists concerned about the lack of 
progress on women‘s equality has begun examining the use of 
gender at the U.N. One piece in the stream of gender-as-
feminism, by Valerie Oosterveld, is a magisterial piece 
canvassing all the uses of gender in the U.N. gender 
mainstreaming system. She describes the definitions of gender 
as either thick (full of elaborations on the meaning and 
relationships of gender and sex) or thin (undefined). She points 
out that U.N. agencies use thick ascriptions of gender, while 
thin is the mode of multilateral negotiations, in part because 
states cannot agree on what they mean by gender.29 Yet the 
thick elaborations still produce relatively impoverished projects 
or at least in human rights, projects that merely add and stir 
 
MARRIAGE in Belize and a broad HOMOSEXUAL AGENDA of what’s called 
“GENDER MAINSTREAMING,” making the gay & lesbian lifestyle accepted 
in our society & culture.‖). 
28. See Kate Bedford, Loving to Straighten out Development: Sexuality 
and Ethno-development in the World Bank’s Ecuadorian Lending, 13 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 295 (2005), available at 
http://kar.kent.ac.uk/1693/1/Straighten_Out_30OCT07DP.pdf, for an 
innovative example of this kind of study; in this case, the Bank is reaching 
both men and women in order to re-configure heterosexual marriage around 
the world into a modern, companionate mode. 
29. See Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for 
International Criminal Justice, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 66-70 (2005). 
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attention to women in service of gender equality.30 
However, my brief foray into tensions within gender 
advocacy circles suggests that fears over losing prioritization of 
funding for work on women, as well as some lingering tensions 
over how to trust attention to men (crudely put, does studying 
men and masculinity diverting attention from the abuse of 
women as well as re-center men as the hegemonic subject?) 
continue to operate. Ironically, this anxiety among advocates 
who are interested in changing gender roles, but are divided on 
whose gender to attend to, operates alongside and 
synergistically with another, distinctly conservative anxiety. 
This conservative anxiety arises within some governments and 
many religious structures that fear that gender analysis will 
ultimately succeed in changing the status quo on masculinity 
and femininity. Working paradoxically together, the divisions 
within progressive advocates coupled with the resistance 
among status quo conservatives operate to keep gender 
analysis and work constrained.31 
Notably, Oosterveld canvassed the negotiated texts from 
U.N. member states in part to better interpret the scope of 
―gender-based persecution‖ in the crimes against humanity 
section of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. This use of gender is the first codification of the term 
―gender‖ in international law making, here in a multilateral 
treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). 
The word‘s inclusion in the Rome Statute was hard fought and 
generated an annotation which reads: ―For the purposes of this 
Statute, it is understood that the term ‗gender‘ refers to the two 
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term 
‗gender‘ does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above.‖32 After the intensity of the fight over the inclusion of 
 
30. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender 
Mainstreaming and Human Rights at the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 1 (2005). 
31. A new UNDP publication on this again proves the rule. See Myra 
Betron, Gary Barker, Juan Manuel Contreras & Dean Peacock, Men, 
Masculinities and HIV/AIDS: Strategies for Action, SONKE GENDER JUST. 
NETWORK (forthcoming 2011/2012) (on file with author). 
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(3), July 17, 
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004-09. 
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the word gender as a mode of persecution (intense, because 
everyone understood they were fighting over the possibilities 
that gender could be unmoored from women as female, even as 
they radically disagreed on the usefulness and the scope of the 
un-mooring) the banality of the definition signals a lowest 
common denominator resolution, as one of my colleagues 
characterized it.33 Moreover, it is an empty tautology. 
Now that the dust has settled from the Rome Statute fight, 
I think the tautology would arguably allow an expansive 
reading of ―gender-based persecution‖ as a crime against 
humanity, including attacks on persons because they failed to 
follow the rules defining what sexed (male- and female- 
identified) bodies are supposed to do, all other elements of the 
definition of the crime being met. Can we argue that the anti-
gender-equality advocates‘ attempt to close down gender in the 
Rome Statute produced a text that in fact leaves space for 
opening gender up to a more capacious reach of persons and 
bodies? As yet, we have not seen an operationalization of this 
capaciousness in the work of the court, however. 
 
IV. Deafening (Gendered) Silence between ―Women‖ and 
―SOGI‖ 
 
Which brings this Essay back to the importance of who and 
what fills in the construct of gender. Whose life motivates 
gender advocacy? This query leads to a deeper engagement 
with my second indicator of gender territorialization: silence 
between gender claims and projects. As the proceeding sections 
suggest, contemporary advocacy claims are channeled into one 
of two gender streams in international human rights law work: 
either directed at women and often concerning violence and 
some aspect of sexual and reproductive health (including 
abortion, SGBV, and sexual exploitation) or now, under the 
new SOGI vehicle, directed at gay men or trans persons (often 
MTF) and embracing freedom from violence, and police or other 
 
33. Compare Oosterveld, supra note 29, with Janet Halley, Rape At 
Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence 
in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2008). 
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criminal justice interference with rights of privacy or 
expression.34 The stream of work under which MSM, gay-
identified global work has begun to proceed since around 2006 
is SOGI, a formulation initially proposed as a way to move 
beyond Western-identified constructs of ―gay‖ and the LGBT 
identity. SOGI has now been reified in global advocacy by a 
host of NGO texts, campaigns, and publications, including the 
Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of Human Rights 
Law to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (YyP),35 a new 
case book on comparative legal decisions on SOGI at the 
national level by the International Commission of Jurists, and 
many other publications, including a new UN report by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.36 
The terms of SOGI‘s application deserve much closer 
examination. The acronym stands in for, and obscures, a much 
more complex reality of diverse sexual and gender practices. 
For example, same-sex sexual practices under SOGI are 
understood to be evidence of a (homo)sexual orientation (SO), 
which is in turn unjustly targeted by the criminal law. 
 
34. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, SEXUALITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Girard, supra note 5; Alice M. Miller, Sexual but 
Not Reproductive: Exploring the Junction and Disjunction of Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights, 4 HEALTH HUM. RTS. 68 (2000), available at 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/47/137_web.pdf; Ignacio Saiz, Bracketing 
Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation-A Decade of Development 
and Denial at the U.N. (Sexuality Policy Watch, Working Paper No. 2, 2005). 
There is a compelling argument that sexual violence is now such a strong 
focus in rights advocacy that it deserves to be called its own ―gender stream.‖ 
This point was flagged by one of my reviewers. 
35. See THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY 6-7 (Mar. 2007), available at 
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf [hereinafter THE 
YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES]. 
36. INT‘L COMM‘N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND 
JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE LAW CASEBOOK (2011), available at 
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=349&sessID=&langage=1&myPage=L
egal_Documentation&id=23865. For the just released UN report, see UN 
Human Rights Council, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND PRACTICES AND ACTS OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS BASED ON THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY (2011), available at 
www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/19session/reports.htm.  
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However, in reality, many of the laws criminalizing same-sex 
sexual conduct, or non-reproductive sexual conduct more 
generally, do not require any manifestation of a stable 
―orientation,‖ merely same-sex or non-reproductive sexual 
practice. However, we are now at an historical moment where 
advocates can reasonably claim that the effect of penalizing a 
conduct is also to penalize an orientation or an identity (a 
SOGI violation). This claim—that an emerging homosexual 
identity is being proscribed—is under-inclusive: some of those 
who are harassed or arrested under the criminalization laws 
may identify with a homosexual orientation, but many other 
may not. On the most basic level, the motivation of the 
criminalization ought not to matter, as consensual same sex 
sexual conduct ought to be free of criminal regulation 
regardless of its relationship to an expression of an identity. 
But it is not quite right to organize all opposition to these laws 
as if they only affect homosexual orientation. 
Moreover, it is not always clear what the link to gender is 
(or is intended to be) vis-à-vis sexual orientation. Persons of 
non-traditional gender deportment and those who wish to have 
a distinct or new gendered identity may or may not also be 
oriented ―homosexual.‖ In practice, however, they may be 
punished under laws and systems that act as if a bio-males‘ 
donning of a skirt is evidence of homosexual behavior even if no 
actual evidence of same sex, sexual activity has been produced. 
However, today gender identity (GI) is sutured to sexual 
orientation in this SOGI phrase in ways that have so far also 
been non-productive for a cross-gender (i.e., across trans and 
bio-women) analyses and coalitions. For example, in the 2007 
Yogyakarta Principles,37 gender is included as ―gender identity‖ 
and has the odd effect of being less immediately friendly to use 
by feminist (i.e. women) gender advocates. Perhaps some of 
 
37. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 
THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES (Mar. 2007), 
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf. I am a signatory of 
the Principles, participated in various steps of their drafting and work for 
their greater acceptance. I am also very aware of their flaws, which I have 
spoken to in various settings. See, e.g., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, YOGYAKARTA 
PRINCIPLES WORKING GROUP MEETING SUMMARY 4-6 (Mar. 11-12, 2009). 
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this chill is due to the YyP‘s form: the YyP‘s betray a preference 
for classic civil and political rights, a focus on public life. I 
would argue that the Principles‘ failure to address gendered 
repressions within families, which affect so many bio-girls and 
women, among other aspects, produce a model of gender 
identity that is static. The YyP, despite their revolutionary and 
important character also produce a rather univocal stance on 
gender expression, as if built only in regard to a certain version 
of transgender.38 
Overall, within the Human Rights Council and the other 
venues (government ministries, UNHCR, etc.) that have taken 
up the SOGI approach, the direction of the work suggests that 
SOGI is understood to benefit MSM, gay identified men, and 
MTF trans persons. There is much less effort to link work on 
SOGI to work on women‘s rights and to gender mainstreaming. 
To counter this concern, some sexual rights/queer feminists in 
human rights advocacy have been dedicated supporters of the 
diffusion of the YyP in particular, and SOGI rights claims, 
more generally around the globe, and work against the tide to 
open up SOGI‘s lock on gender to merge it with a diversity of 
women‘s claims around gender expression and diversity, and to 
unpack ―women‖ as a diverse category. 
 
V. Whose Gender is Expressed through Gender Identity in a 
Woman‘s Convention? 
 
This rare use of SOGI as a claim within women‘s human 
rights makes SOGI‘s sudden appearance in two new general 
recommendations adopted by CEDAW in late 2010 all the more 
startling, and worthy of interrogation: how did it get there, and 
does it mean something interesting for gender/sex in CEDAW 
that it did? Does it remedy the silence and bifurcation between 
gender-as-women and gender as gay-ish man? 
CEDAW has been among the most resistant sites in the 
 
38. Many of these flaws are being addressed by advocates, e.g., a recent 
Guide to Activists seeks to present ways to work through these problems. An 
Activist’s Guide to the Yogyakarta Principles, 
http://www.ypinaction.org/content/activists_guide (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). 
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human rights treaty system for work on diverse sexualities or 
diversity of gender expression among women. This resistance, I 
have argued elsewhere, stems in part from the Committee‘s 
paralysis by its status as a symbol, even prize, of political 
struggles over gender equality.39 It is hyper-scrutinized by 
conservative advocates who are often both anti-gender equality 
and anti-sexual rights: the Catholic and Family Human Rights 
Institute (C-Fam) and the Heritage Foundation have both 
made CEDAW a special target of attacks.40 
CEDAW‘s non-discrimination imperative (ensuring the 
ability of women to enjoy their rights on an equal basis with 
men) in Article 1 directs governments in Article 5 to eliminate 
―prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.‖41 
CEDAW‘s work follows the male-female binary as set up by its 
mandate: its work has been predictable, which is not to say 
unimportant—the practices of gender control of women are real 
and serious, and often deadly. In service to this concern, 
however, CEDAW focuses predominately on women‘s 
vulnerability to abuse at the hands of men, and to girls and 
women‘s exclusion from equality with men in spheres of public 
and private life, only some times touching on the 
 
39. See Alice M. Miller & Mindy J. Roseman, Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights at the United Nations: Frustration or Fulfillment, 19 REPROD. HEALTH 
MATTERS 102 (2011). 
40. For a discussion of how the U.N., and CEDAW in general, fear direct 
protection of women‘s sexuality, see GRACE SMITH MELTON, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND., CEDAW: HOW U.N. INTERFERENCE THREATENS THE RIGHTS OF 
AMERICAN WOMEN (2009), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/01/CEDAW-How-UN-
Interference-Threatens-the-Rights-of-American-Women; Susan Yoshihara, 
CEDAW Reality Check (Catholic Family & Human Rights Inst., Briefing 
Paper No. 3, 2007), available at http://www.c-
fam.org/docLib/20080626_CEDAW_Reality_Check.pdf. See also CYNTHIA 
ROTHSCHILD, INT‘L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N & THE CTR. FOR 
WOMEN‘S LEADERSHIP, WRITTEN OUT: HOW SEXUALITY IS USED TO ATTACK 
WOMEN‘S ORGANIZING (2005), available at http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/article/publications/reportsandpublications/8.html. 
41. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
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discriminatory impacts of intra-gender regulation of women, 
for example at the hands of mothers-in law in some contexts. 
CEDAW has strongly criticized exclusions and 
disadvantages to women which are produced by the constraints 
of social, family, and legal pressure to conform (e.g., in the 
manifestation of too few women in non-traditional women‘s 
work); and has deemed violence an aspect of enforcing 
conformity to be ―good, traditional‖ women. However, it has 
been relatively chary in work on how gender-analysis works to 
protect the rights of ―bad women‖ (i.e., women who transgress 
multiple gender roles or violate other social rules), such as 
women under prosecution for crime (including war crimes), 
women who sell sex,42 and for women who are too different 
(sexually or in gender performance) from other women. In 
regard to trans-women and lesbians, the Committee has on 
occasion praised state recognition of gender-diversity-within 
women as a group. For example, CEDAW has used its 
―concluding comments‖ (the public statements made by the 
treaty body as part of the evaluation of the country reports 
made by States party to the treaty to this effect43 when rights 
 
42. For an early concern about ―bad women,‖ see Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, To Bellow like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse 
of Rights, in WOMEN‘S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 
1994). 
43. A very recent set of comments to South Africa is particularly rich on 
sexual orientation: 
 
39.  The Committee notes that the State party has in its 
Constitution the prohibition of discrimination based on the 
sexual orientation of individuals. However, the Committee 
expresses grave concern about reported sexual offences and 
murder committed against women on account of their 
sexual orientation. The Committee further expresses its 
serious concern about the practice of so called ―corrective 
rape‖ of lesbians. 
40. The Committee calls on the State party to abide by 
its Constitutional provisions and to provide effective 
protection from violence and discrimination against women 
based on their sexual orientation, in particular through the 
enactment of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation 
that would include the prohibition of multiple forms of 
discrimination against women on all grounds, including on 
the grounds of sexual orientation. The Committee further 
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issues on lesbians or trans women were raised by NGO 
submissions or state reports. Overall, however, the 
Committee‘s interpretive work has been very narrow vis-à-vis 
women and gender. One way to think of this narrowness is that 
CEDAW has accepted a gender-limited understanding of its 
role in protecting women‘s equality rights: that women should 
be able to pursue equality with men in the economic sphere, 
regardless of gender stereotype, but not that women or men 
should radically remake the rules of inequitable or repressed 
respectable society. I think it is fair to say that the Committee‘s 
vista of protection of women‘s rights under CEDAW has been 
limited by its own sexual and gender normativity, and it has 
measured women‘s equality with men in a limited register. 
Advocates have been dancing gingerly around getting 
CEDAW to formally address non-hetero-normativity, especially 
sexual diversity, as a prohibited basis for discrimination 
against women for over fifteen years, (i.e., through a gender 
recommendation or interpretive statement).44 Insider reports 
have made it clear that in the past some members of the 
Committee were ready to quit before allowing diversity of 
sexual orientation to be addressed as a matter of human rights 
laws‘ protections. Thus, while the concepts linked to gender 
identity or expression could be useful for a range of women, 
and therefore be key aspects of women‘s human rights analysis 
generally, they have not been used; moreover, trans women as 
rights holders under CEDAW did not garner attention as 
specific issues in the Committee‘s jurisprudence until recently, 
 
recommends the State party to continue its sensitization 
campaign aimed at the general public, as well as providing 
appropriate training to law enforcement officials and other 
relevant actors. 
 
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 48th Sess., Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2011, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 (Apr. 5, 2011). 
44. For a discussion of CEDAW‘s silence on lesbianism, see generally 
INT‘L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM‘N, UNSPOKEN RULES: SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND WOMEN‘S HUMAN RIGHTS (Rachel Rosenbloom ed., 1995); 
Julie Mertus, The Rejection of Human Rights Framings: The Case of LGBT 
Advocacy in the U.S., 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 1036 (2007). 
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despite the efforts of advocates since the early 1990s. 
Yet, in two general recommendations adopted by the 
Committee in December 2010, one on older women and one on 
state obligation under article 2 the Convention, the CEDAW 
Committee has now inserted ―sexual orientation and gender 
identity‖ as part of their list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.45 The two General Recommendations are a 
fascinating pastiche of terminologies: I think the use of the 
terms ―sexual orientation and gender identity‖ in these 2010 
statements reflects the march of the SOGI advocacy—this 
phrase appears in both recommendations, even as drafters 
initially reached for words like ―sexuality different lifestyles‖ 
and ―lesbian women‖ in their first debates over the terminology 
in the texts.46 General Recommendation 28 (GR 28) elaborates 
the core commitments that states undertake in ratifying the 
treaty and is therefore a central doctrinal text, so I will focus 
on its terms. In GR 28, SOGI appears in the section addressing 
intersectional discrimination. The recommendation places 
SOGI in the midst of a list of characteristics of women, as in its 
list of other discriminatory grounds, i.e. ―race, ethnicity, 
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual 
 
45. This section draws from a recently published article. See Mindy Jane 
Roseman & Alice M. Miller, Normalizing Sex and Its Discontents: 
Establishing Sexual Rights in International Law, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
313 (2011). See also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 27 on Older Women and 
Protection of Their Human Rights, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.1 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47-
GC1.pdf; U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties 
Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-2010-47-
GC2.pdf. 
46. For example, three of the twenty-three experts voted in favor of the 
term ―sexuality or different lifestyles‖ in their discussion of terminology for 
the general recommendations. At other points during their debates, a 
majority initially chose the terms ―lesbian women‖ and ―women with different 
lifestyles.‖ See Rep. of the CEDAW, 46th-48th Sess., July 12-30, 2010, Oct. 4-
22, 2010, Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/66/38; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. 
No. 38 (2011), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/38. 
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orientation and gender identity.‖47 The rote inclusion has the 
strange effect of treating sexual orientation and gender identity 
differences as connected no more or less to sex as disability, 
ethnicity, or refugee status are connected. And it has the effect 
of assuming a permanent connection between (homo)sexual 
orientation and (non-conforming) gender identity for women, a 
connection between gayness and trans–ness which has already 
been naturalized for men. 
It is entirely unclear to me what this inclusion of SOGI 
means to the Committee. For example what does it connote 
about the protections of CEDAW vis-à-vis the gender 
expression of fem lesbians (women who dress and comport 
themselves as socially stereotypical feminine women and are in 
lesbian relationships or claim a lesbian identity) or butch 
straight women (women who dress and comport themselves in 
ways society deems masculine, and are in heterosexual 
relationships or identify as heterosexual)? Will the Committee 
require full genital and breast creation surgery for transwomen 
to count as women under the Convention? We do not have 
enough information from its limited past work on gender 
diversity within women to know. 
Each of the enumerated prohibited grounds for 
discrimination in CEDAW‘s list of terms has a unique and 
specific interaction with the treaty‘s focal ground of 
discrimination on the basis of sex. Inter-sectional analysis 
should require us to think through the mechanisms and the 
effects of each of these interactions, such as: age and sex; sex 
and race; or sex and refugee status, etc. The interactions can be 
cumulative: sex and sexual orientation and refugee status and 
national origin, for example. In working through the 
interactions of these axes of discrimination and the inclusion of 
SOGI, part of me applauds the Committee‘s inclusion of SOGI 
as just two sets of characteristics among many, thereby 
escaping the (false) imprisonment of all understanding of 
sexuality under the sex/gender matrix. 
 
47. See General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of 
States Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 45, at 5 (emphasis 
added). 
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However, given the questions and lack of an institutional 
history in engaging with diverse sexualities and gender in 
CEDAW‘s history, the more likely explanation for the rather 
wooden inclusion is a lack of in-depth discussion within the 
Committee on the nuances of the terms ―sexual orientation‖ or 
―gender identity.‖ I would posit that the political engine that 
was sufficient to overcome the log jam of CEDAW‘s self-
protective fear of naming sexual diversity was also an engine 
that did not have the analytic tools to explain the connections, 
in part because the bifurcated gender advocacy practice I am 
describing in this Essay. 
SOGI has proved itself to be a powerful neologism; it calls 
forth new advocacy but may also obscure past work on 
diversity of gender roles, expressions and conducts, as well as 
diversity of sexuality. Readers of earlier drafts of this Essay 
asked, what has happened to scholarly attention to the 
advocacy work to protect women who want to live without 
marrying men regardless of the direction of their erotic desire, 
or of persons who seek to have sex without erotic motivation, 
but for well-considered strategic and material advantage? My 
concern is that SOGI, and the attention to very particular 
persons that are now constructed as its objects, freezes gender 
into a singular identity, and may fail to protect a diversity of 
practices for persons across male, female spectra. Both 
advocacy and scholarship are constrained. I am hopeful but not 
confident that CEDAW‘s recent incorporation of SOGI, however 
wooden, may help unfreeze the rigidity of SOGI‘s attachment to 
bio-male bodies; for it to do so, however, requires supporting 
analysis of greater complexity than many advocates are 
currently deploying in their blinkered streams. 
 
VI. Gender as if Sexuality48 
 
CEDAW‘s initial silence on gender diversity, and now its 
explosive shout out to gender and sexual diversity, calls our 
attention back to the constantly invoked, but today the far too 
 
48. For an excellent introduction to sexual rights advocacy at the UN 
and its spillover effects on gender, see Girard, supra note 5. 
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rarely examined, link between gender diversity and sexual 
diversity. Here propagandists for the Vatican have named the 
beast best: Gabriele Kuby, a German advocate for the Vatican, 
flagged earlier for her unusual attention to gender 
mainstreaming as harming men, writes: 
A specter is haunting the world, the specter 
of―gender! Hardly anyone knows this concept, 
although it is extremely powerful and has 
extended its influence over international and 
national institutions. The gender ideology is in 
the process of creating a new man, whose 
freedom should include the choice of his sex and 
sexual orientation. This means to arbitrarily 
decide whether he or she wants to be man or 
woman, heterosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
transsexual (GLBT).49 
Kuby articulates a pan-gender-sexuality link, i.e. the way 
in which women and men, heterosexuality, and homosexuality 
are somehow uniquely and tightly linked as a set of practices 
and ideas: vary gender and you must create (perverse) 
variation in sexual orientation and sexual conduct. Yet the very 
advocates against whom she mobilizes Christian values are 
themselves not currently linking their work on gender across 
their silos of work on heterosexuality and homosexuality, or 
across regulation of women and regulation of men or regulation 
of trans persons. In calling for advocates to attend to the way 
their work on gender has implications across a great diversity 
of gender and sexuality I am not calling for a reversion to the 
simplistic MacKinnonite (or Kuby) framework that claims that 
all of gender can be explained simply by sexuality.  
For advocates seeking freedoms around gender, sexuality 
is currently the prime site for attaching rights protections for 
many aspects of nonconformity. This is true for gender-non-
conforming men, as if sexual conduct were the only aspect of 
their diversity worth rights protection. It is also true when 
sexuality is emphasized as the site of harm for women, as if 
 
49. Kuby, supra note 26. 
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abusive sexual activity was the only acts through which women 
experience gendered harm. I am a sexual rights advocate, so I 
am not saying sex is not important, but we must re-incorporate 
other planes of injustice (material/market and cultural/political 
and racial/ethnic) to ensure that we have given up the territory 
of non-sexual struggles as places where we fight for equality 
and diversity.50 
 I think advocates and scholars need to confront the ways 
that the deafening silences between gender advocates and 
advocates‘ fights over the Solomon‘s baby of gender are 
evidence of incomplete gender analysis and truncated political 
alliance building. Advocates in human rights can profitably 
research, document, and publicize the many kinds of links—
and discontinuities— within gender, and between gender and 
sexuality in radically different contexts around the globe. 
Working from the understanding that gender and sexuality are 
linked but not congruent systems, such that gender contributes 
to but cannot alone account for sexual variation, and that 
paying attention to how gender and sexuality are linked not 
only to each other but also are implicated in other structures of 
power, could then return to gender analyses early potential as 
a tool for global justice for all persons. 51 
In this Essay I have sought to call attention to the way 
that gender non-conformity conduct challenges hetero-
 
50. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence against Women, and Human 
Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS. 16 (2004) (exploring the hyper-visibility of sexual violence against 
women in the women‘s rights movements). 
51. My position relies on the insight Gayle Rubin initially laid out in her 
early and still powerful essay of 1986. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a 
Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: 
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1987). For her later 
comments on gender as an analytic tool, see Judith Butler, Against Proper 
Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth 
Weed eds., 1997). I am grateful to many conversations over the last decade 
with Carole S. Vance for deepening my understanding of these complexities. 
Thus, in my scheme, trans-genderism is just that—transiting across gender 
(between or choosing masculine identities from feminine birth assignment or 
vice versa). It does not signal ―gay‖ unless more factors of sexuality are 
added; however, in the U.N.‘s institutionalization of gender, transgender is a 
―sexual minority.‖ 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
2011] FIGHTING OVER THE FIGURE OF GENDER 867 
 
normative sexuality, but also note that we must distinguish 
when gender is doing work/being used to do work outside, or at 
least alongside, of the sexual in the sense of sexual conduct. 
The gender sectarianism of today‘s advocates makes these 
distinctions very hard to discern—the fissures obscure the 
many ways that gender is not all about/only about sex and vice 
versa. 
 
VII. Gender as a Grant, an Agenda Item or as a Way Forward? 
 
As Gita Sen has described, part of the current problem can 
be traced to the assimilation of gender to shorthand struggles 
within identity politics, rather than a use of gender analysis to 
focus on relational power constructs working through meaning 
ascribed on the basis of bio-sex differences.52 She highlights the 
way that in identity-based advocacy, gender appears in some 
contexts as the term substituting for the word ―women,‖ or in 
other contexts gender flags gay men or transpersons but ceases 
to capture the systems of gender that operate at all levels to 
create vulnerabilities and privileges across these various 
categories. 
I argue that CEDAW included SOGI not as part of a deep 
analysis of the structures of gender and the related systems of 
sexuality that but as a result of a mix of limited understanding 
and the pressure of internal and external politics. This process 
of uneven but potentially powerful or reductive inclusion of 
new ideas in the development of rights jurisprudence is of 
course not unique to CEDAW. In my experience accidental, 
inadvertent progress and some deliberate advance marks all of 
law making in which social movements, experts, and States 
interact at the U.N. The Committee was no doubt was trying to 
catch up with contemporary gender/sex concerns, but in its 
laboring over the politics of diversity it was led to use SOGI 
because this neologism now constitutes the set of terms that 
 
52. Interview by Mindy Jane Roseman with Gita Sen, Public Policy 
Professor, Ctr. for Pub. Policy, Sir Ratan Tata Chair Professor, Indian Inst. of 
Mgmt., at Harvard Law School (Dec. 15 2009). For a short history of the 
―apolitical‖ use of the word ―gender,‖ see Joanna Regulska & Mindy 
Roseman, What is Gender, 5 TRANSITIONS 24, 24-29 (1998). 
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have become the most available words in the lexicon of rights, 
gender and sexuality. They are part of an important, 
influential, and funded campaign for rights associated with 
SOGI.  
In the world of advocacy today, as foretold in a cautionary 
tale by Ann Snitow in 1999, ―gender is a grant.‖53 Neither I nor 
Snitow mean attention to funding to be simplistically damning: 
it is rather a recognition of the multiple material realities that 
shape advocacy practice as a modern form, especially as it 
moves from volunteer elites to paid, more diverse albeit 
predominately but not exclusively middle class players. And 
such attention flags the costs of playing in the international 
spheres.54 
What I do intend to connote by ―gender as a grant,‖ 
however, is that one of the effects of grant-making on the NGO 
practice of working with gender is a move toward activities 
that have continuity over grant periods, and strategies that 
produce measurable, goals. In reports to funders, NGOs must 
demonstrate that targets and goals can be met.55 This push 
toward realizable strategies by itself is not a problem. (Nor is 
the main problem the grim new work of living from funder‘s 
deadline to funder‘s deadline, as described by one of Snitow‘s 
 
53. Ann Snitow, Cautionary Tales, 93 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 35, 40 
(1999). 
54. To speak of funding and grants in this way is emphatically not to be 
sucked into the over-heated notion that well-funded international and 
national NGOs are running the world, a la the critiques of Joseph Massad et 
al., calling out the ―Gay International.‖ One can be concerned with the 
disproportionately Northern interventions and inaccurate renderings of 
complex gender/sex politics without granting them sole power in running the 
world, including by ―disappearing‖ the actual and increasingly strong voices 
from the global South in these discussions, and without sliding into alliances 
with repressive regimes in the West and the East as they deploy claims of 
cultural purity and ―Western Export‖ politics to silence dissidents. 
55. The hugely ethically important question of ―accountable to whom‖ is 
suggested but not addressed in this discussion. For an exploration of the 
reification of ―accountability to beneficiaries‖ in the humanitarian world, see 
Meg Satterthwaite, Indicators in Crisis: Rights Based Humanitarian 
Indicators in Post Earthquake Haiti, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 865 (2011). 
For a trenchant, if self-referential discussion of human rights ―doing wrong,‖ 
see DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2005). 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/6
2011] FIGHTING OVER THE FIGURE OF GENDER 869 
 
colleagues in the Network of East-West Women.) However, I 
think part of the real problem is that ―gender as a grant‖ 
requires an easily describable, mono-vocal past and a 
predictable, or at least, bench-markable, future. A problem in 
―gender as a grant‖ is that the process of working in this way, 
in defining benchmarks and elaborating where one‘s ―value-
added‖ lies, exacerbates working with ―gender as a territory.‖56 
―Gender as a grant‖ requires asserting that your issue will be 
raised in a notable, stand-alone way, and it is further reified by 
the practice of advocating for specific agenda items in U.N. fora 
as evidence of the legitimacy of your issue. 
In this institutionalization of identifiable success stories in 
gender, gender claims are rewarded when tagged to gender-as-
women, in one part of the agenda (e.g., in the Human Rights 
Council), and rewarded again when gender is tagged to as 
gender identity and sexual orientation, linked to a different 
agenda item in that same Session. 
As advocates, we fight to advance what we believe to be 
important, and our failures, and even more terrifyingly our 
successes, can be institutionalized and take on shapes and 
practices we did not intend. In short, we screw up. In the 
relative success of putting gender into institutional terms, we 
have created gender territories to be defended, and gendered 
issues as border territory to be overtaken through struggles 
among human rights advocates. 
As scholars our critiques are useful to alert advocates to 
the collateral damage of successes, of ―strategic essentialisms‖ 
about women, gender, transgendered persons, gay-ness, and to 
take measure of the moves under foot. But the usefulness of 
scholars has also been lessened by our tendency to critique 
from behind the walls of the academy, as well as by a tendency 
to discover a topic, elaborate, publish, and move on before 
hearing back from engaged advocates—in regard to their 
efforts to incorporate critiques. Perhaps some of this impetus 
 
56. As Snitow also said over a decade ago: ―‗Gender‘ is not a nation to 
which anyone is required to migrate. It is, rather, a variable, a central one in 
the future ways in which labor, government power and economic activity are 
all going to be structured, not to mention daily psychic life.‖ Snitow, supra 
note 53, at 42. 
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also is driven by trends in funding in the academy—our own, 
―gender as a grant‖ problem. 
As I asserted at the beginning, gender as an analytic tool 
can still perform important justice work, although not always 
by itself, but intertwined with attention to analytics of race, 
citizenship, age, sexuality, and other axes of power and 
difference. Some U.N. players seek to freeze gender as a binary 
of man/woman in service of their own politico-religious 
imperatives, such as the Holy See or the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), and the George Bush administration 
(a position not yet fully corrected under President Obama). 
But my analysis suggests that the Holy See‘s position is a 
paradox: its advocacy leadership has figured out how to 
operationalize a duality: they preach about the rules of gender 
as if they were separate universes of law (the law of women, 
the law of men).57 At the same time, resistant even to the use of 
the word ―gender,‖ the Holy See‘s advocates make a point of 
publicizing the structural and material links between gender 
diversities and sexual diversities, claiming vast conspiracies of 
gender advocates, in order to shut down diversity. Ironically 
the groups seeking to open up that diversity, by virtue of 
myopic sectarianism, have reduced their ability to unify across 
genders and sexualities, leaving (hetero)women squaring off as 
if against gay men. 
I would argue that persisting in turf wars or disregarding 
the gender advocacy of others is to further the destruction of 
the very coalitions and political synergies that gender as an 
analytic tool initially made possible, and which could re-emerge 
as a productive lens with which to engage with human rights. 
That is to say, gender territorialization threatens to strike a 
mortal blow to gender as a politically useful rubric for 
expansive and generous social justice work in global human 
rights. This serious blow follows on and is exacerbated by 
another fault line within gender and rights, arising when 
 
57. Pope Benedict XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for 
the Celebration of the World Day of Peace: The Human Person, the Heart of 
Peace, VATICAN: THE HOLY SEE (Jan. 1, 2007), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf
_ben-xvi_mes_20061208_xl-world-day-peace_en.html. 
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gender frames fail to attend to the ways in which other systems 
of power organized around race, nationality, age, (dis)ability, 
language, or ethnicity themselves construct and are altered in 
turn by, gender, and at times by sexuality and thence 
distinguish and diminish access to resources. 
 ―Intersectionality,‖ now a bit frayed as a theoretical frame, 
is nonetheless still a useful call in rights-oriented policy work, 
as using it can move advocates away from isolating or de-
contextualizing solutions for silo-ed groups of victims and 
toward more structural and sustainable change, benefiting a 
greater diversity of persons.58 By interrogating the dynamics of 
gender sectarianism in this Essay,59 I hope to be part of a 
conversation and a practice that begins identifying and 
challenging these divisions from within different gender teams. 
Based on the way work that gender is also doing in ‗covering‘ 
for sexuality, I think we must also challenge rights work on 
gender and sexuality to work more carefully with terms and 
assumptions around gender and sexuality.  
Just as we must assure ourselves that we all benefit from 
justice across race, ethnicity, religion, age, and nation, I 
suspect fundamentally we may also have to reassure ourselves 
that we all benefit from liberation from gender binaries and 
sexual repressions.  
This work to reflect and think critically within advocacy 
groups is important, because I think we can take as a given 
that the powers that oppose the capacious analytic tools of 
gender understand the stakes of the gender shifts. If we take 
 
58. An Intersectional approach ―analyz[es] the disempowerment of 
marginalized women [by] attempts to capture the consequences of the 
interaction between two or more forms of subordination. It addresses the 
manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other 
discriminatory systems create inequalities that structure the relative 
positions of women, races, ethnicities, classes, and the like. Moreover, 
intersectionality addresses the way that specific acts and policies operate 
together to create further disempowerment. Background Briefing on 
Intersectionality, WORKING GROUP ON WOMEN & HUM. RTS., 
http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/bkgdbrfintersec.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
59. This word is borrowed from a conversation with Carole Vance on the 
day of the Symposium. Thanks to her for helping with this insight. 
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the optimistic mode, that advocates do indeed seek gender 
equality for a diverse ―all,‖ I think we benefit by paying 
attention to the tension playing out within gender advocacy, in 
that we might better understand the political stakes of not 
recognizing the links between the issues of gender non-
conformity in any territory. As Mary Anne Case‘s remarks in 
the Symposium60 point out, the Vatican has figured out that 
homosexuality and abortion, access to condoms for married 
women and men having sex with men are conjoined politically 
and ideologically as issues of gender and sexual non-
conformity, why can‘t we? 
Equally important, however, I hope this exposé ties back to 
the optimistic call of the original questions for this panel: what 
are the possibilities for the future? To answer this I turn again 
to the works of Adam Phillips and his approach to uncertainty 
as a form of maturity, and move beyond the questions about 
flirting with which I began the Essay. Looking to end the fight 
over gender, I think we need to consider how we proceed when 
we recognize that we are in a place that Phillips terms ―the 
struggle between the commonsense struggle for survival and a 
struggle for the survival of the imaginative vision.‖61 
If there is an interest in challenging the current bifurcated 
and reified gender story being told on all sides, in creating 
space within rights advocacy to use gender in a capacious yet 
penetrating tool of analysis, then we have to develop a new way 
of working with, and flirting with, gender.  
 
 
 
60. After Gender? Examining International Justice Enterprises, PACE L. 
SCH. (Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://streamingmedia.pace.edu/edmedia/PLRSymposium11-12-10.wmv. 
61. ADAM PHILLIPS, THE BEAST IN THE NURSERY: ON CURIOSITY AND 
OTHER APPETITES (1998). Phillips finishes his thought by reference to ―the 
wish, and whatever comes to meet it,‖ suggesting we are indeed able to call 
up new futures. 
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